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CASE COMMENTS
lative barriers, National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). But there seems to be no
valid reason for giving immunity to labor organizers, although it
is true that some of their activities are in their very nature within
the guaranty of freedom of speech as being a concrete expression
of a social ideal, namely unionism. Even so, it is well to remember
that unionism is also big business. Then too, the activities of a
union organizer are not always above reproach and may create a
vital community concern. For example he may use force or threats
of force against employees who refuse to join the union, or he might
commit acts of violence, or cause such acts to be committed in an
otherwise peaceful picket line. See NLRB v. Local 140, United
Furniture Workers, CIO, 233 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1956). Perhaps if
the organizer were required to make his presence known through a
reasonable registration requirement then such activities would be
curtailed or at least be less frequent because the notoriety given to
his presence would lessen the effects of his actions.
It is submitted that a state does have a substantial interest in
the protection of its citizens inasmuch as it has the right to protect
them from being defrauded or otherwise harmed by any form of
solicitation; and a requirement of registration of labor organizers,
absent any discretionary feature which does not prohibit the expres-
sion of social ideas whether they be unionism or whatever, should
be allowed without objection. It is sincerely felt that our concept of
free speech will lose nothing for such regulation, but on the contrary
a valuable function of the state police power will not be thwarted.
J. L. R.
CoNsTrrumoNAL LAw-TAXATiON OF INTErSTATE Comm~nvcE--
RAmoAD Loop TAImc.-P railroad originates in Virginia and
passes through West Virginia, with two loop deviations into Virginia
and Kentucky totaling six miles. P is taxed for the privilege of doing
business in West Virginia on the basis of a percentage of its property
within the state, as well as on a percentage of its net income earned
within the state. W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 12a, § § 2 and 5b (Michie
1955). In a declaratory judgment action, P contended that the loop
traffic should be considered in determining whether such tax con-
stituted a direct burden upon the interstate business of P. D de-
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murred in part. Sustained. Upon certification to the Supreme
Court of Appeals, held, in part, that P did not allege sufficient facts
from which it could be determined whether the tax, imposed in
part on P's loop traffic, constituted a direct burden on interstate
commerce. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Field, 100 S.E.2d 796 (W.
Va. 1957).
The general rule is that no state can tax the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951); Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U.S.
171 (1903); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888). A tax
on the privilege has been held to be a direct burden on the com-
merce itself. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1
(1910); but see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 837 U.S. 362
(1949); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33 (1940); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938) (cases following the cumulative burden dichotomy).
On the other hand, interstate commerce is expected to pay its
own way. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). Therefore
a given state may tax the local incidents, activities or privileges of
commerce, interstate in nature. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309
U.S. 157 (1940); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331
(1939); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113
(1920).
It cannot be denied that the loop traffic in the principal case
constituted commerce among the several states. See Central Grey-
hound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Hanley v. Kansas City
So. Ry., 187 U.S. 617 (1903). Nevertheless, transactions involving
more than one state are not necessarily interstate commerce for
taxing purposes, when the involvement of more than one state is
purely voluntary and not really required. Wiloil Corp. v. Penn-
sylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); cf. International Harvester Co.
v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
An early case, Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192
(1891), presented a situation somewhat analogous to the principal
case. Here the Court denied that continuous railway traffic between
two points in Pennsylvania was interstate commerce, even though
passing for a short distance through New Jersey. In upholding a
tax imposed by Pennsylvania on the railroad's intrastate traffic, the
Court concluded that loop deviations caused by engineering diffi-
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culties, such as the interposition of a mountain or stream, will not
impress upon intrastate intercourse an interstate nature.
Undoubtedly, the Court, in the Lehigh Valley decision, erred
in denying that such loop traffic did not constitute interstate com-
merce, but as pointed out by Justice Holmes when later citing the
case, the tax itself was probably valid since it was determined in
respect of receipts for that portion of the transportation within
Pennsylvania. Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry., supra; see also United
States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 228 U.S. 835 (1912).
A later decision, Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, supra,
found the Court invalidating a New York tax on the gross receipts
from transportation of passengers between two points in New York,
but over a route forty percent of which traversed New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. The surprising feature of the case was not the holding
itself, but the trend of the Court's reasoning as revealed by dictum
to the effect that the tax on interstate commerce would be valid
if apportioned as to the receipts attributable to the mileage within
New York.
If the rationale of the Central Greyhound case were applied to
the loop traffic in the instant case, it would seem that a state tax
aimed at the purely intrastate activities of P railroad would neces-
sarily have to take into consideration P's loop traffic and apportion
the tax accordingly. Such reasoning may be theoretically sound, but
the taxation of commerce is a very practical rather than a theoretical
concept, and the trend of the Court in recent years, with some
notable exceptions, has been to apply practical tests rather than
technical concepts when questioning a tax which is alleged to
unreasonably burden interstate commerce. See e.g., Interstate Oil
Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, supra; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 836 U.S. 169 (1949).
As pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in Central Greyhound
Lines v. Mealey, supra, it is not so much a question of whether a
particular state tax is directed at interstate commerce, but whether
the state is merely exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that
aspect of interstate commerce to which the state bears a special
relationship. In short, is the degree of burden imposed reasonable
or unreasonable under the circumstances in any given case? See
e.g., Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951);
Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 812 U.S. 359 (1941).
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From a practical standpoint, taxation of the loop deviation in
the Central Greyhound case, covering over forty percent of the
entire route, would understandably burden interstate commerce to
an unreasonable degree, whereas the degree of burden imposed
in the instant case through taxation of the loop would appear to
be so insignificant as to invoke the de minimis rule. See Brown,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-What Now?, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 899 (1950).
In any case, the past decisions of the courts would bear out a
conclusion that in a situation involving an inconsequential loop
deviation, caused by geographical conditions, and closely related
to the intrastate traffic, the deviation itself becomes constitutionally
insignificant for taxing purposes. Therefore the taxing state need
not apportion its tax in consideration of a minor detour, but may
consider it as business carried on entirely within the state. See e. g.,
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, supra; Lehigh Valley Ry. v.
Pennsylvania, supra; American Barge Lines v. Koontz, 136 W. Va.
747, 68 S.E.2d 56 (1951).
D. L. McC.
CONSrTIUTIONAL LAW - WITNESSES - PRIvnGFE AGAINST SEMF-
INcRIMINA O r.-A, secretary-treasurer of a labor union, was issued
a personal subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to him in his official capacity as a union officer, for
appearance before a federal grand jury investigation. He failed to
produce the demanded books and records, and refused, on the
ground of self-incrimination, to answer questions pertaining to their
whereabouts; he was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt upon
his repeated refusal to answer. This conviction was upheld by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Held,
on certiorari, that despite the fact that a custodian of records
voluntarily assumes a duty which overrides his claim of privilege
as to the records themselves, he does not thereby waive the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to oral testimony
concerning his failure to produce the records. Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
The much discussed and often maligned portion of the Con-
stitution of the United States which gives rise to the principal case
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